Showing posts with label Contests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Contests. Show all posts

Feb 10, 2017

The Fall of Constantinople: A History Reimagined

Finalist - 2015 Curtin Prize

“The spider has wove his web in the Imperial palace; and the owl hath sung her watch-song on the towers of Afrasiab”  
 - Sultan Mehmed II (Gibbon 1216)

On May 29th, 1453, the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II’s army swarmed into the Byzantine city of Constantinople. In the midst of the bedlam, the last Roman Emperor was faced with an impossible dilemma. Should he flee from his doomed city to fight another day, or remain to meet his imminent demise? Pondering this, Constantine XI, last of a political entity that remained untouched since the days of Augustus, tore off his Imperial ornaments and charged into the fray as a common soldier amongst thousands. The death of Constantine marked the end of the Eastern Roman Empire, which had survived a millenium after the collapse of its western counterpart. While the body of the fallen emperor was never found, the light of the Roman Caesars was now extinguished.

The Fall of Constantinople is one of the most romanticized moments in world history due to the many intrigues surrounding its demise. The reign of the Emperor Constantine XI began upon the death of his elder brother John VIII Palaiologos in 1448 (Constantine XI Palaeologus). But the Roman Empire that Constantine inherited was not the mighty classical state that spanned from the coasts of Spain to the grasslands of Syria (Emmons), but a rotting husk of little more than southern Greece and the ancient city of Constantinople (Constantine XI Palaeologus). At the helm of a dying empire, Constantine was faced with a clear and immediate danger. Young Mehmed II saw Constantinople as a Christian menace within the vast sea of Sunni lands, and thus made preparations to bring the city under Ottoman control. Understanding the dire nature of the threat, Constantine began preparations for war.

Knowing fully well that the Ottoman forces outnumbered his own, Constantine sought help from the West.  This did little good, as “Aside from small contingents of Genoese and Venetians—who had economic interests in Constantinople to protect—the European powers did nothing.”(Constantine XI Palaeologus). Thus, when Mehmed’s army of eighty thousand laid siege to the great Christian city on the 1st of April, Constantine commanded an army of merely seven thousand soldiers at the defense (Runciman 85). Despite an admirable effort to fend off the Ottoman assault, Mehmed’s troops were far too innumerable, far too skilled, and far too well-equipped for the small defense to overcome. The city fell nearly two months later, becoming the capital of the Ottoman Empire and establishing supremacy of the Crescent over the Cross (Constantinople Falls to the Ottoman Turks: May 29, 1453).

And yet, what if the river of time was stemmed, turned in a different direction? What if Constantine, with the assistance of some pivotal divergences in history, was able to stymie the armies of Mehmed and keep Constantinople in Christian hands? Could the Byzantines have risen up to the challenge, to defeat an opponent of such overwhelming fortitude? In simple terms, yes. Despite his heroism, Emperor Constantine XI made three crucial mistakes in his reign that doomed his war effort and allowed the Ottomans to win the battle.  History is by no means a path of certainty, and it is possible that even the most indiscernable change in its outcome could have great effect upon the way we look at the modern world.

In historical speculation, moments that speculators choose to alter are commonly known as “Points of Divergence” (PoD’s). This paper will feature three Points of Divergence within Constantine’s lifetime that were the difference between triumph and defeat. The history we have come to know saw Constantine’s greatest efforts all come for naught. But with these divergences in play, perhaps the last of the Romans would be able to taste the air of victory, and roar what the Romans once oft-cried at their zenith: “Vae Victis!”  


Point Of Divergence #1: Constantine Breaks The Bank!

In 1451, Constantine XI Palaiologos was approached by a brilliant craftsman known as Orban. Described as “One of a growing band of technical mercenaries who plied their trade across the Balkans” (Crowley), Orban offered to the Byzantine Emperor to  “construct a cannon that could blast the walls of Babylon itself” (Runciman 78). The superweapon in question, a precursor to the famed Dardanelles Gun, was a magnificent cannon “27 feet long. The barrel, walled with 8 inches of solid bronze to absorb the force of the blast, had a diameter of 30 inches, enough for a man to enter on his hands and knees and designed to accommodate a stone shot weighing something over half a ton.” (Crowley). Constantine, weary of draining what meager resources his empire had left,  paid Orban such a paltry wage for his work that the irked weaponsmith “decided to try his luck elsewhere. He made his way to Edirne to seek an audience with the young sultan” (Crowley). Orban of course was welcomed with open arms by the young Mehmed II, eager to use any advantage possible to conquer the last Byzantine stronghold. When Mehmed at last decided to display his masterpiece on April 12, 1453, all of Constantinople trembled, and as Roger Crowley remarked, “the world's first concerted artillery barrage exploded to life.”

The devastation that Orban’s Cannon brought upon the Byzantine defenders was both physical and psychological. The cannonfire “with a deafening roar, broke into a thousand pieces as they hit the walls; and the masonry could not stand up to them.” (Runciman 97).  The sight of the Theodosian walls having “crumbled wherever it was hit” (Crowley) was traumatic to the siege defenders. Indeed, the introduction of this uber-cannon doubtlessly expedited the downfall of the Byzantines, and deprived them of what little vigor they had left. Thus, Constantine’s decision to deny Orban proper funding proved disastrous in the long haul. So how could it have been possible for Constantine to rustle up what was left of his coffers and simply pay the master inventor before it was too late?

A possible means of funding Orban is by means of external support. While it is rather unlikely that any one man could fund the effort, there may be a few individuals who could ease the burden of such an expenditure. The foremost option was Orhan, an exiled grandson of Sultan Suleiman residing in Constantinople. As a pretender to the throne, Orhan had been banished into the Byzantine city from an extremely young age (Runciman 56). The Emperor Constantine XI saw the maintenance and care of the Turkish prince, in exchange for which he offered his services during the siege of Constantinople (Runciman 84). As a token of goodwill, the Sultan “approved an annual payment of 300,000 aspers… for his relative’s expenses in Constantinople” (Philippides 397).  Orhan was in legal possession of “Greek towns in the lower Struma” (Runciman 61), the source of his awarded pension (Philippides 397). If Orhan was willing to fight to the death for the Emperor who provided him shelter from his rival, it would stand to reason that he would be willing to make financial concessions to the imperial cause. In addition, the last procession of Constantinople (hours before its fall) featured “The celestial image of the Virgin Mary… in solemn procession” (Gibbon 1209) as well as several other state treasures, implying that Constantine had yet to expend all of his imperial reserves. If Constantine had rummaged through his territories in Morea, his remaining treasures (admittedly, close to none) in Constantinople, and the fading wealth of his Orthodox church, it is possible that he may have had the funds necessary to prevent Orban’s defection.

In a divergence, Constantine is able to convince Orhan and other state allies to pool money together for Orban’s cannon. With money available to spare, an intrigued Constantine grants the young cannon-maker ample funding to put his gifts unto good use. Satisfied, Orban now works tirelessly in Constantinople to build his cannon, and finally perfects it on March 29, 1453. In awe at the splendour of Orban’s masterwork, Constantine proudly parades his super weapon to the masses in the city centre, to thunderous applause. Orban’s cannon renews a sense of hope and vigour in a previously despondent populace, a fact that will go a long way in defending Constantinople from invasion.


Point Of Divergence #2: Mother Russia To The Rescue!

As oft-maligned as the Byzantine Empire became in its final hours for its lack of allies in the East or West, it should be known that Constantine had one last friend to beg for aid. The Russian and Byzantine Empires had a rich history of both warfare and diplomacy. Originally a pagan foe of the Byzantines (Hussey 140), the Russians began to establish a diplomatic foundation in 988 CE after Prince Vladimir of Kiev arranged for a marriage between himself and the sister of the Emperor Basil II, Porphyrogenita Anna (Hussey 516). In exchange, Vladimir and the citizens of Rus (later Russia) were to convert to Orthodox Christianity, a bargain that was readily accepted. As a testament to the two nations’ friendship, the first of the elite Varangian Guards (the bodyguards of the Byzantine Emperors) were actually “sent by Svjatoslav’s son Vladimir… in fulfilment of an agreement he had contracted with the Empire in the previous winter.” (Hussey 516). Due to this longstanding cordiality between the two Empires, it would stand to reason that reigning emperor Vasily II would be willing to provide assistance to his Byzantine ally. If Constantine had pursued further relations with the Russians, could he have extended the lifeline of his empire?

To create a divergence, Constantine delivers a passionate oration in the Royal Court of Moscow to the blind, but no less skilled Emperor Vasily II (Vasily II). The Byzantine Emperor implores that as a defender of the Orthodox faith, it is the obligation of a Christian Emperor to defend Christian lands, even when others neglect to do so. Constantine further elaborates that Constantinople is all that stands between Western dominance for the Muslim menace, and its defeat will signal the end of Christian glory forever. After consulting with his ministers about Constantine’s speech, Vasily tells Constantine that he will indeed defend the great city of Constantinople from Muslim invaders. Personally assembling an army of 10,000 men to the gates of Constantinople, Vasily II The Blind grants the Byzantines one final chance at survival.
Point of Divergence #3: An Apple A Day Keeps The Papacy Away

Constantine XI, for all intents and purposes, was a strong ruler despite the tragic circumstances of his reign. He was able to handle the diplomatic nightmare of maintaining unity amongst multiple Greek and Latin peoples in his realm, as “such was his personality that he won their co-operation” (Runciman 84) and his riveting final speech to the siege defenders, rallying them to fight till the death was in the words of Edward Gibbon “more glorious than the long prosperity of the Byzantine Caesars.” (Gibbon 1210). However, the last Roman Emperor’s legacy is marred by his most enduring blunder: the attempted reunification of the Catholic and Orthodox churches. After the Latin Pope and Orthodox Patriarch engaged in a mutual excommunication in 1054 (Boojamra), Christian Catholicism and Orthodoxy became harshly divided. This divide culminated in the Latin Sack of Constantinople in 1204 as a result of the botched Fourth Crusade (Andrea). Despite the obvious animosity between the two churches, Constantine believed that the only way to save the Roman Empire was by acknowledging papal supremacy and ensuring Western aid (Constantine XI Palaeologus). While this looked like a logical plan in theory, it was a complete disaster in application. Further inspection reveals why the reunion was doomed to fail from the start.

Firstly, the last time a Pope had any real military prowess was centuries before Constantine’s birth. The last Papal offensive against Islam was in 1272, and it failed to accomplish anything of note (Bauer 373). Susan Wise Bauer notes that while these final crusades were existent in theory, “The expedition [of 1272] to Tunis and Edward’s journey to Acre, neither of which had anything to Jerusalem-and neither of which offered anything in the way of actual fighting- were later known to some historians as the Eighth and Ninth Crusades. Other chronicles did not even grant the name.” (Bauer 373). In addition, the assistance that Nicholas actually ended up providing Constantine was miniscule: fifteen papal galleys that arrived after Constantinople had fallen (Runciman 81,161). For historical perspective, the Ottoman fleet that defeated the Christian Order known as the Knights of St. John in 1551 numbered greater than 100 galleys (Glete 102). Even if they had actually fought, it’s unlikely that these meager reinforcements would have done any good for the long run. Lastly, the surrender of the Orthodox church to Rome was an outrage to the Greek population, some of whom asserted that they would “prefer to see the Sultan's turban in their city than the Latin mitre” (Nicol). The Byzantines were notoriously ineffective when forced to assemble with non-Romans, as “The Greeks refused often refused to serve with foreigners and threatened to desert if forced into such unwelcome contact” (Diehl 205). By attempting the reconciliation, Constantine alienated his own subjects and angered many potential allies, furthering the discord amongst the defenders. With this in mind, would it have been possible for Constantine to resist the temptation to seek Western aid, and prevent the internal strife that followed?

In our divergence, Constantine’s successful attempt to seek assistance from Orthodox Russia prevents him from wasting resources in a reconciliation attempt, deeming such an exploit irrelevant to the war effort. It is important to note that in our history, Genoese wünderkind Giovanni Giustiniani, who was responsible for much of the defense of Constantinople, was one of the soldiers-of-fortune “who were ashamed of their governments timidity and who came to fight of their own will from Italy to fight for Christendom.” (Runciman 83). Thus, “the driving force of the defense” (Hussey 773) would still be available to the Byzantines barring a major Byzantine-Genoese fallout. This passiveness to the Pope returns Eastern-Western relations to a degree of hostility, but not enough to trigger any serious conflict between the two sides. This change of heart from Constantine removes any hatred the Orthodox population of the Empire felt towards their leader, giving Constantine a greater base of ethnic Greeks to draw upon, as well as the support of his Church and people.


The Fall: A Fate Averted

On April 1st, 1453, Sultan Mehmed II begins his unprecedented assault on the city of Constantinople, hoping to end Christendom in the East once and for all. “Already, during the winter of 1451 he began recruiting competent builders, familiar with military works and fortifications, whose mission would be to build a powerful fortress on the Bosphorus… it became eventually known as Rumeli Hisar. ” (Hatzopoulo) creating a devastating chokehold on the Thracian region. Constantine XI recognizes the danger immediately, and corresponds with Vasily to prepare for an ardorous fight in order to cross the Black Sea. Constantine prepares for assault in the same manner as in the original timeline, delegating his troops to the outer wall, and abandoning the interior barrier of the Theodosian fortress (Runciman 91). The knowledge that Russian reinforcements are en route causes morale to soar within the gates, uplifting the spirits of the defenders for the coming battle.

Mehmed’s first assault is in accordance with our own timeline, with a key change. The Turkish Emperor immediately orders his artillery weapons to bombard the Theodosian Walls, but fate is far less kind this time around. With Orban never defecting to the Ottomans, Mehmed lacks the decisive technological advantage to instill fear in the Byzantines. Mehmed’s artillery now mainly consists of relatively ineffective cannons, supplemented in number by medieval-era trebuchets. The battered but vigilant defenders are able to hold steadfast against these far less threatening weapons, and the Ottomans find virtually no success in their barrage.

With the artillery becoming impotent against the Byzantines, the frontier of war shifts to the Bosphorous. Constantine, as in our timeline, orders a massive chain to be laid out across the harbor to prevent auxiliary ships from crossing the Golden Horn. Mehmed brilliantly anticipates this, and orders special ships with greased logs to cross Galata, thus circumventing the chains (Runciman 105). This time, however, Constantine is completely prepared to deal with this tactic. At the bays of Pera, the log-ships and their carriers are met with a small fleet of Byzantines and their allies, who ordinarily could be dealt with with little thought. This particular regiment however, has been trained to utilize Orban’s cannons on their galleys with precision. The Ottoman fleet is ravaged, rendering it irrelevant for the remainder of the conflict. Without a naval frontier to worry about, Constantine is not pressured to sap the strength of the land defenses by adding more troops to the Bosphorous, in turn strengthening the walls.

The Byzantines, having held strong against Ottoman assault, have aggravated Mehmed. The Sultan’s efforts to build mines under the Byzantine defenses have also been thwarted by the Byzantine engineer Johannes Grant (Runciman). On May 26, the Sultan convenes a war council, calling for a final and colossal assault on the city. Meanwhile, despite the constant warring, the inhabitants of Constantinople are still in high spirits from their successes, along with the hope of reinforcements. After two days of prayer and rest, the Ottomans assemble their army for their complete charge on May 28 (Hatzopoulo). As they advance, the air is suddenly pierced with jovial roars from within the city. The Russians have arrived! Vasily and his men were able to take Rumeli Hisari from the Turks after a week-long struggle, and have advanced into the city. Constantine embraces the emperor of Russia, and declares that he is forever indebted to them for their charity. Now with ten thousand soldiers at their disposal, the Theodosian Walls are manned to their fullest extent. The Kerkoporta gate, which in our timeline was left open for the Turks to burst through (Hatzopoulo), is now sealed and fully protected. Russian aid to the city is a massive blow to morale outside the wall, and forces a remarkable change to the Ottoman battle plan. Realizing that morale must be restored to ensure a successful assault, Mehmed himself decides to lead the invasion.

In the afternoon of May 28, Mehmed sends his auxiliary troops to the gates, in hopes of wearing down the defenders. However, the invigorated Russian-Byzantine coalition is prepared. Cannon-burst and Greek fire are rained down on the army, removing them with haste. Unable to breach the walls, Mehmed next sends the elite Janissary warriors to break the line. However, the combined forces of Genoese soldier-of-fortune Giovanni Giustiniani and Vasily are able to hold strong against their attack. After hours of fighting, the dwindling Janissaries are forced to withdraw and regroup with the regular army. Watching his dream of conquest crumble, Mehmed delivers a fiery speech to his exhausted troops, rallying them for a final and all-out assault. Mounting his white stallion into the battle, the Sultan leads his army to the gates of Constantinople. The last great battle of the siege has begun.

Vasily II  is manning his position at Blachernae, when the thundering war cry of eighty thousand Ottomans rips across the battle-streaked sky. Recognizing what is about to happen, the Russian Emperor orders for all soldiers to advance to the Outer Wall and prepare for an assault on the frontal gates. Constantine opts to defend the city from the ground level. The Byzantine Emperor leaves charge of the Inner Wall to Giustiniani, who is not fatally wounded due to the abandonment of artillery use earlier in the battle (Runciman 138). With a little less than twenty thousand men at the wall, Constantine prepares to define his legacy forever, either as the man who lost Constantinople to the infidels, or the Emperor who kept the Roman Empire alive for another day.
The last great battle for the city is marked by the surreal image of the Ottomans, now a horde of vicious warriors, charging with little haste into the gates of Constantinople. Above them, Russians and Greeks let loose countless volleys of stones, arrows, and fire down onto their besiegers. Mournful hymns can be heard on both sides of the battlefield, and the clash of steel is deafening. Mehmed’s troops are sustaining grievous losses, but still push forward in a desperate attempt to storm the city. The gates of Constantinople are fabled and sturdy, but by no means impregnable. After an hour of warring at the Walls, Mehmed’s battered troops break open the gates and enter the outskirts of Constantinople.
Constantine is waiting.
Armed with Orban’s Guns, Greek Fire, and what remains of the Byzantine Artillery, one thousand Greek troops stand ready to face the depleted Ottoman offensive. Mehmed had chosen to spearhead the charge, and it would be this boldness that would be his undoing. With a screeching wail, Orban’s gun comes to life, annihilating the Turkish front. Mehmed and his stallion are among the unfortunate souls at the tip of the assault. The most ambitious Sultan to ever grace the office is no more. The frantic nature of the onslaught has ensured that no Lieutenant is able to recover the departed sultan in time, and thousands of Ottomans watch in terror as their leader is vanquished in a fiery burst. Morale all but dissipates in the invading army. With the fatigued Ottoman advance in shambles, the Byzantines take advantage. An invigorated Constantine and his army rushes into the heart of the fighting. Elsewhere, Vasily II and the Russians descend the wall to join the melee. The Ottomans are at last overwhelmed. Breaking rank and terrified, the Turkish army halts the siege and flees the city.
At last, the day is won for the Romans. Constantine has defended his Empire from marauding foes once more through shrewd politics and wise counsel. Vasily and his Russians, Orban and his cannons, the defection from the Pope’s schemes, these were the factors that gave Constantine a chance to redeem the failures of his Empire, to give him the right to call himself a Caesar for another day. And what will come next? The defeat at Constantinople would certainly be a devastating blow to Ottoman morale. Furthermore, Mehmed’s death would leave control of the Empire in the hands of six year old Bayezid II, not exactly a recipe for political stability (Bayezid II). If the Ottomans were to fragment due to this civil strife, could it be possible for Constantine and his withered Empire to re-establish sovereign over lost lands? Or perhaps this is wishful thinking, perhaps Constantinople was doomed to fall, and even this valiant effort would be in vain. Regardless, the hopeless odds Constantine bravely weathered have been reversed with but a few changes in Constantine’s approach. This alone reflects a lesson on the malleability of history, and a direct proof that moments in time are neither predestined nor set in stone.


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May 20, 2016

The Turkish Dilemma: Janissaries, Syria, And Slavery

Finalist - 2016 Curtin Prize 




As the Sultan Suleiman I breathed his last on the 7th of September, 1566, his dominion
was at the absolute peak of its power and expanse. Through relentless vigor and fierce
determination, Suleiman “The Magnificent” had seen the dawn of a new era in Turkish history,
where the great Ottoman Empire’s might stretched from the ports of Tunis to the banks of the
Tigris. The Ottoman state had, by the turn of the 16th century, become the most powerful and
feared empire in all of Europe. At the heart of this grand military engine were the Sultan’s fabled
Janissary corps. An elite and privileged creed of warriors, the Janissary order was the result of
the two century old Devsirme System, which scoured the Ottoman Balkans for Christian boys to
capture and train as the Sultan’s personal retinue in the capital. Taken from their homes and
converted to Islam, these ethnicities perceived as “foreign” were deliberately targeted by the
Turkish elite. A hundred years after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, its successor state,
the Republic of Turkey, is being called into question for an exploitation of foreign elements
within their ranks as veritable slaves. Syrian refugees, fleeing the terrible struggles that are
plaguing their country, have been subject to sweatshop labor in Turkey’s developing economy,
which benefits greatly from such egregious violations of human sanctity. By utilizing foreign
children as a means of integral labor within their borders, Turkey has found itself emulating the
Devshirme System of the Ottoman state.

The Devsirme System which flourished from the late 15th to 17th centuries saw Janissary
captives being taken into coerced labor for the state from a very early age, as are the present
Syrian child laborers in the Turkish industry. The Janissary order itself saw its inception in 1330
CE as personal bodyguards for the Ottoman Sultan (Davis and Hamilton). Although initially
conscripted from prisoners in the captured Byzantine city of Adrianople in 1356 CE, the lack of
necessary manpower from captives prompted Sultans to build a more reliable pool from which to
draw their soldiers. From the 15th century onwards, boys were exclusively selected for the
Janissary corps from Christian families in the Balkan peninsula, the most populous group of
nonethnic Turks in the burgeoning empire (Davis and Hamilton). At the height of their
effectiveness, the Janissaries numbered 20,000 in number under Suleiman I, growing at a rate of
3,000 officers per year (Davis and Hamilton). Such numbers reflect a rapid pace of inducting
children into the core of the Ottoman slave engine, a staggering population shift reflected in the
21st century under Turkey.

The Republic of Turkey, though presently at far less of a disposition to capture and
export their own citizens to Istanbul for militaristic purposes, is nonetheless guilty of housing an
equally dubious enterprise within their borders. 1.7 million migrant Syrians have fled to Turkey
due to the Syrian Conflicts, lacking adequate food, shelter, and employment to survive in their
new environment (United States. Department of Labor). To many fleeing Syrians, the stable,
powerful, and well ordered Turkey offers the haven and structure for them to thrive once more,
despite its high living costs (Tali). The country has been greatly praised for its embracing of
Syrian refugees through permits and sponsorship, but closer scrutiny reveals that “S yrians are
required to obtain formal sponsorship in order to work, and permits are typically granted only to
highly skilled refugees” (Tali). Without the ability to easily obtain legal work, children have
become “breadwinners” due to their ability to more easily learn languages and job skills at a
young age (Tali). As Turkey’s child labor protection laws(namely Article 71 of Labor Act and
Annex 3 of the Regulation on Methods and Principles for Employment of Children and Young
Workers ( 38 , 39 ) do not apply to agricultural enterprises with less than 50 workers, small shops
with less than 4 workers, or domestic services, Syrian children can be left vulnerable to
exploitation and poor working conditions ( United States. Department of Labor) . Already, some
400,000 Syrian children are reported to have been working in Turkey, making “a third to half of
what Turkish people make.” at minimum wage (Tali). As a fresh pool of laborers become open
for exploitation, both the Turkish and Ottoman models encourage the seizure of young laborers
for the state.

The Devsirme System and Turkish sweatshops are and were maintained in great part
however, due to their coveted place amongst Balkan Christians and Turkish Syrians. Upon being
brought to Istanbul (then Constantinople), Janissary recruits were forced to undergo numerous
physical and intellectual examinations, being trained in “ Arabic, Persian, Turkish, math,
calligraphy, Islam, horsemanship, and/or weaponry” (Devshirme System [Gravure]). These
skills, alongside the “material benefits and social privileges” of the Janissary corps made the
position highly desired by Christians hoping to bolster their status in the empire (Radushev 15).
In his novel The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, Lord Kinross
remarks on the notion that:

Unnatural as such enslavement might appear in the eyes of the West, it proved in its own
context to be an enlightened and practical formula for using to the full the qualities and
skills of the Sultan’s young Christian subjects, to the benefit of the Empire and indeed of
the slaves themselves. For soon they came not to resent but to value their enforced status,
for the privileges which it brought to them and which were denied to the Moslemborn”

The privileges of the Janissary order, serving as administrators, governors, tax collectors,
and even on occasion as Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) of the vast and rich Ottoman Empire,
were evidently held in great esteem by the Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire, allowing
such a form of slavery to be selfreinforcing throughout its three century tenure (Morier 11;
Devshirme System [Gravure]; Radushev 6). In the same vein, the the prosperity of Turkish child
labor lies in the skills developed and right to live under Turkish protection from the horrors
presently ongoing in Syria.

Despite clearly illegal connotations, child laborers from Syria value and need these
occupations to maintain the safety and prosperity of their families. The Guardian reports that:
A key aim of the new work permits is to ensure Syrian refugees in Turkey receive the
minimum wage, currently set at 1,647 lira a month (£379). Their illegal status and lack of
any bargaining power mean that, for many, wages are far below this level (Johannisson).
Without proper labor permits or support from the Turkish government, countless Syrians
are required to work illegally in order to sustain themselves (Johannisson). Syrian children are
therefore presented with a crucial role in ensuring that their families are able to sustain a life in
Turkey (Tali). The skills that Syrian children learn in Turkish shops and industries are essential
however, to pursuing a greater future. A 16 year old textile worker named Adil remarks that “ In
three years, I learned everything I could. Now I can operate all the machines and do ironing.”,
and further elaborates, “I learned a lot about textile. When the war is over and we go back to
Syria, I can get a good job.” (Tali). When the chaos in Syria at last dissolves, it appears that a
generation of Turkish migrant laborers like Adil will return equipped with the qualities to
contribute in the Syrian labor force. As such, despite their slavelike implications, both Balkan
Christians and Syrian refugees stay and stayed within the system due to the prospect of social
mobility in the future.

The elite prowess of the Janissary order were fundamental to Ottoman expansionism,
much as the labor of Syrian child refugees are to the developing Turkish economy. The
Janissaries first burnished their legend as the first through the gates in the spectacular Capture of
Constantinople, and further proved their worth at the Sieges of Rhodes and Vienna as the
Sultan’s first line of offense in the amazing Turkish conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries (Davis and Hamilton; Balfour 108). Until the dawn of the seventeenth century,
Janissaries were the beating heart of Turkish civil and administrative efforts, dominating the
Ottoman bureaucracy (Davis and Hamilton). Janissaries further contributed to the smaller
markets in towns and provinces, having “the privilege, when quartered in a town, to share the
profits of the tradesmen, by assisting them in their shops” (Morier 1011).

So high was the demand for Janissary officers that in some villages, Janissaries could from the majority of a
population (Radushev 4). The power and skill of the Janissaries was a driving force in the
development of the Ottomans to the apex of their power. Turkey, in many senses, emulates the
need for nonethnic labor to sustain their economic development.

Turkish businesses and sectors have seized the opportunity of such a large Syrian
diaspora to further their own (and by extension, the country’s) monetary stimulation (Tali). It has
been estimated by some that 60% of the Turkish textile industry is composed of unregistered
workers (Johannisson). In 2013, Turkey “repealed laws protecting children from other heavy and
hazardous work and revised regulations to allow employment of children between ages 16 and
18 in brick and plastics factories” (“Turkey”), allowing more teenage individuals to be brought
into manual labor. Murat Erdogan of the Migration and Politics Research Center at Hacettepe
University in Ankara reports that, a Syrian refugee working in Turkey is “more likely to be a
child than an adult,” and “Especially in seasonal or laborintensive sectors like agriculture,
construction or textile, Syrian child labor has become the norm,”(Tali). Especially in the seasonal
agriculture and hazelnut industries, the labor pool has experienced a vast influx of Syrian
children as a result ( “Turkey”). The continued economic growth of Turkey brings a glaring need
for foreign labor, most readily available from the vast swaths of refugees emerging from Syria.
As a result both the Ottoman and Turkish states utilized and continue to utilize ethnic labor in
their domains, in order to fuel their own ends. In both scenarios however, such wanton violation
of liberty runs the risk of equally tremendous backfiring.

The Janissary order, and therefore the Devshirme institution, was a critical factor in the
destruction of the Ottoman Empire because of the empowerment of its slavepopulace.
With a developing Turkish economy, it may be possible that integrated Syrians could one day pose a
similar threat to Turkish Sweatshops. Where they had once been forced to remain celibate, the
Janissaries were granted the right to hereditary succession and marriage in 1579, immediately
following the death of the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (Radushev 12). Now holding
priority in the preservation of their family position over the continued seizure of talented
Christians, the Janissaries became dramatically reduced in their military capabilities by the end
of the sixteenth century (Davis and Hamilton). The practice of sending Janissaries as the
ferocious front line of the Ottoman army had incurred enormous and mounting casualties, which
became less and less remediable with the decline of mass Devsirme recruitment(Davis and
Hamilton). In his expedition to Egypt in 1801, Englishman J.P Morier degrades many Janissaries
as “poor effeminate Asiatics” (Morier 9). Although English accounts of the day were notoriously
insensitive to the virtues of foreign cultures, the decline of the Janissaries from Europe’s most
powerful warrior slaves to a corrupt and altogether ineffective institution is evident with such
scornful statements. Although welcomed at the time, the rise of 19th century nationalist
movements within the Ottoman Empire were exacerbated by the Devsirme model, as “The
memory of this practice left a deep impact on the historical memory of generations, often
generating negative national feelings towards the Ottoman Turks and their rule in the Balkans”
(Radushev 15).

Lastly, and most crucially, the Janissaries’ extensive powers within the empire
gave them the ability to exert influence on the Sultan himself, even gaining the right to remove a
Sultan at will throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Davis and Hamilton). Due to
this, the Janissaries’ extensive powers allowed them to force the Sultan to abandon the Devsirme
practice, in turn permanently moulding the Janissaries into a poorly trained group of extortionists
and bullies ( Radushev 3). The Devsirme System crumbled down upon itself once the captured
masses of Balkan Christians gained the necessary foothold in the Ottoman system to exert
genuine influence on society. If in some time in the distant future, Syrian refugees can advance
up the ladder through their efforts in the Turkish industry, they may find the voice to speak out
against the illicit working conditions that they were put through. If this was to be fully revealed
and protested against, the growing Turkish economy may be put in jeopardy with increased
apprehension by the international community. In both realities, Turkish and Ottoman, the power
of those placed under laborious conditions can rise to make their voices heard, and present no
end of trouble to those that once lorded over them.

The Devsirme System, which helped define Ottoman Turkey for centuries, lives on in the
Turkish utilization of Syrian migrant workers. The displacement of ethnic minorities for the sake
of labor towards the state are indisputably identical in nature for both sides, as is the placement
of these groups towards fields of great use to the country in question. A process of assimilating
the minority demographic within their labors remains stalwart amongst the two, as is the
acceptance of their new place in society by both oppressed Balkan Christians and Syrians.
Lastly, the rise in power and influence for both groups could be seen as the death knells for both
systems, as the very oppressors found themselves treading in deeper waters than they could have
ever imagined. The Ottoman model, efficient, swift, and unspoken, proved that it’s unsettling
methods can survive in an everglobalized and increasingly humanitarian world. One need only
know where to look.

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